This case was not handled by our firm. However, if you have any questions regarding this case, or any employment matter, please contact Joseph Maya at 203-221-3100 or by email at JMaya@MayaLaw.com. Employment discrimination laws protect employees from discrimination. They do not protect against “ordinary workplace experiences” that offend one’s sensibilities or result in hurt feelings. … Read More
Court Gives Plaintiff in Bullying Case Green Light to Proceed to Trial
This case was not handled by our firm. However, if you have any questions regarding this case, or any education matter, please contact Joseph Maya at 203-221-3100 or by email at JMaya@MayaLaw.com. In August 2006 Robert and Louise Dornfried filed suit against the Berlin Board of Education, its former and current superintendents, the principal, the… Read More
Student Too Late for Claims Against University
If you have a question or concern about special education law, school administration, federal standards, or the overall rights of a student, please feel free to call the expert education law attorneys at Maya Murphy, P.C. in Westport today at (203) 221-3100. This case was not handled by our firm. However, if you have any… Read More
Hostile Work Environments and the Faragher/Ellerth Defense
This case was not handled by our firm. However, if you have any questions regarding this case or Employment and Labor Law, please contact Joseph Maya and the other experienced attorneys at Maya Murphy, P.C. today. Call us at (203) 221-3100 or by email at JMaya@Mayalaw.com, to schedule a free initial consultation. In a landmark… Read More
Failure to Hire Due to Race, Gender, Sexual Orientation… and Political Viewpoints?
By Lindsay E. Raber, Esq.
The State of Connecticut has in place a particularly comprehensive, sweeping statutory scheme (collectively the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act[1]) that outlines the prohibition of discriminatory practices in employment on a variety of bases:
Race, color, religious creed, sex, age, gender identity or expression, marital status, national origin, ancestry, present of past history of mental disability, mental retardation, learning disability or physical disability, including but not limited to blindness.[2]
LGBT individuals enjoy recognized protections under State workplace discrimination law.[3] Furthermore, there are additional federal laws through which an aggrieved party may seek recourse.[4] Thus, under Connecticut law, employers, including school districts, cannot refuse to hire or discharge an employee on any of the above bases.
What happens, however, if an aggrieved party alleges that he or she was not hired because of his or her political beliefs and advocacy? Such is the case of Teresa Wagner, who sought to teach law courses at the University of Iowa College of Law (UI). A staunch conservative Republican and UI alum, Ms. Wagner “previously worked for the National Right to Life Committee, which opposes abortion and euthanasia, and the Family Research Council, which takes conservative positions on social issues.”[5] At the time Ms. Wagner applied for two legal research and writing positions at UI, she was “already working part-time at the law school’s writing center” and “had received positive reviews” for her performance in that capacity.[6] She did very well during the interview process and “her application was well received by the Committee.”[7]
On the other hand, the law school faculty “is viewed as being liberal. Only one out of 50 professors is a registered Republican.”[8] In an email to the dean of UI, the associate dean wrote:
Frankly, one thing that worries me is that some people may be opposed to Teresa serving in any role in part at least because they so despise her politics (and especially her activism about it).[9]
In addition, Ms. Wagner’s “primary, vocal opponent to hiring her” was a professor who “had clerked for Justice Blackmun during the time Roe v. Wade was written, has written tributes to Justice Blackmun and his abortion jurisprudence, and has published legal articles advocating a pro-choice viewpoint on abortion.”[10]
Subsequently, a job offer was extended to an adjunct legal research and writing instructor who was less qualified and “portrayed himself as a liberal to other employees at the Writing Center.”[11] The second position remained unfilled, and Ms. Wagner received word that she was not being hired. She filed a civil rights lawsuit in federal court, alleging UI’s dean discriminated against her in violation of the First Amendment’s right to political speech and association. However, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of UI, thus dismissing the case, citing qualified immunity protection.
However, on appeal, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding that “[t]he district court erred in finding that qualified immunity protects [UI’s dean] from liability in her individual capacity.” As the Court noted in part, “[UI’s dean] had several indications that Wagner’s political beliefs and associations may have played a role in the faculty’s hiring process.”[12] Despite such notice, the UI dean failed to hire Ms. Wagner, and her “position as a supervisor does not shield her from liability.”[13]
The trial in this case has already begun, and it will be interesting to see the results. Though Connecticut does not recognize political affiliation as a protected class in discrimination cases, no doubt the outcome of this case may result in widespread implications if the courts find in Ms. Wagner’s favor.
If you are the victim of discriminatory practices and treatment in the workplace, it is imperative that you consult with an experienced employment law practitioner. The lawyers at Maya Murphy, P.C., assist clients in Bridgeport, Darien, Fairfield, Greenwich, New Canaan, Norwalk, Stamford, and Westport. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact Attorney Joseph C. Maya. He may be reached at Maya Murphy, P.C., 266 Post Road East, Westport, Connecticut (located in Fairfield County), by telephone at (203) 221-3100, or by email at JMaya@mayalaw.com.
[1] Connecticut General Statutes § 46a-51 et seq.
[2] Connecticut General Statutes § 46a-60(a)(1).
[3] Connecticut General Statutes § 46a-81c.
[4] See, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).
[5] “Lawsuit Pits Political Activism Against Campus Diversity,” by Adam Liptak. January 9, 2012: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/10/us/sidebar-lawsuit-against-iowa-law-school-pits-activism-against-diversity.html
[6] “Trial starts in liberal bias lawsuit against former University of Iowa law dean,” by Chris Minor. October 16, 2012: http://wqad.com/2012/10/15/trial-starts-in-liberal-bias-lawsuit-against-former-university-of-iowa-law-dean/?hpt=ju_bn5
[7] Wagner v. Jones, No. 10-2588 at 3 (8th Cir. Ct. June 16, 2011).
[8] Id.
[9] Id. at 7.
[10] Id. at 6.
[11] Id.
[12] Id. at 19.
[13] Id. at 22.
Sexual Harassment in the Workplace
This case was not handled by our firm. However, if you have any questions regarding this case or Employment and Labor Law, please contact Joseph Maya and the other experienced attorneys at Maya Murphy, P.C. today. Call us at (203) 221-3100 or by email at JMaya@Mayalaw.com, to schedule a free initial consultation. What may or… Read More
Mere Inclusion of a Restrictive Covenant Does Not Invalidate Entire Contract
Mere Inclusion of a Restrictive Covenant Does Not Invalidate Entire Contract
Wes-Garde Components Group, Inc. v. Carling Technologies, Inc., 2012 Conn. Super. LEXIS 899
Wes-Garde Components Group, Inc. (“Wes-Garde”) and Carling Technologies, Inc. (“Carling”) executed an agreement on December 31, 1979 wherein Wes-Garde would receive “permanent favorable pricing” on certain electrical components manufactured by Carling, contingent upon maintaining annual threshold purchasing levels. The contract was amended on January 1, 1988 and it stayed in effect until 2008. The agreement between the two companies contained a covenant not to compete where Carling specifically agreed to refrain from entering the distribution market for certain electrical components.
Carling informed Wes-Garde on June 19, 2008 that is considered the agreement unenforceable and as such the company was under no contractual obligation to provide favorable pricing or abide by the non-compete provisions. December 1, 2008 marked the first date that Carling actually failed to provide favorable pricing, per the contract, while transacting with Wes-Garde. Wes-Garde ultimately sued Carling and requested that the court enforce the agreement. Carling moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the whole contract was unenforceable because it contained an “unreasonable restraint of trade” in the form of a mutual covenant not to compete. The Superior Court in the Judicial District of Hartford denied Carling’s motion for summary judgment and unequivocally rejected the argument that the mere inclusion of the mutual non-compete agreement necessitated the invalidation of an entire contract willingly executed by the parties. The details of a specific non-compete agreement may render that portion of the contract unenforceable but there is not a principle under Connecticut law espousing the idea that the mere presence of a restrictive covenant invalidates an entire agreement.
Wes-Garde opposed the motion for summary judgment on procedural grounds due to Carling’s failure to specify the ground on which it moved or make a specific reference to the covenant not to compete. Carling’s pleading did not establish specific facts or allegations regarding the non-compete agreement nor did they identify it as the grounds for moving for summary judgment. Carling failed to provide the court with the necessary information and the opportunity to evaluate the non-compete agreement based on its particular provisions. The court could have ruled on the enforceability of the non-compete agreement had Carling introduced specific facts or pleadings regarding those contractual provisions.
Carling’s defense, where a party alleges that the inclusion of a covenant not to compete invalidates a whole agreement, is universally rejected by courts in Connecticut and cannot be successfully argued as an avenue to render an entire agreement unenforceable.
If you have any questions relating to your non-compete agreement or would like to discuss any element of your employment agreement, please contact Joseph C. Maya, Esq. by phone at (203) 221-3100 or via e-mail at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.
Investigatory Meeting Even With Possible Consequences Not an Adverse Employment Action
This case was not handled by our firm. However, if you have any questions regarding this case or Employment and Labor Law, please contact Joseph Maya and the other experienced attorneys at Maya Murphy, P.C. today. Call us at (203) 221-3100 or by email at JMaya@Mayalaw.com, to schedule a free initial consultation. Employees sometimes find… Read More
Employers Not Liable for Doing “Stupid” or Even “Wicked” Things
This case was not handled by our firm. However, if you have any questions regarding this case or Employment and Labor Law, please contact Joseph Maya and the other experienced attorneys at Maya Murphy, P.C. today. Call us at (203) 221-3100 or by email at JMaya@Mayalaw.com, to schedule a free initial consultation. Employment discrimination laws… Read More
Court Denies Employee’s Motion for Summary Judgment Because Parties Dispute Material Facts of the Case
Court Denies Employee’s Motion for Summary Judgment Because Parties Dispute Material Facts of the Case
Webster Financial Corporation v. Levine, 2009 Conn. Super. LEXIS 841
Mr. Gerald Levine sold his shares of LLIA, Inc., a financial and insurance firm, to Webster Financial Corporation in February 2000 along with other shareholders of the company. He executed a Stock Purchase Agreement, Employment Agreement, and a Non-Solicitation Agreement with Webster Financial in connection with the transaction. The agreements contained a series of restrictive covenants that prohibited Mr. Levine for two years following termination from soliciting or accepting any brokerage business from entities that were LLIA or Webster clients during his employment with the company. He worked as a Webster Financial employee until June 2007 when he voluntarily terminated his employment and began to work at Beecher Carlson Insurance Services, LLC, a firm providing similar services. Webster Financial sued Mr. Levine and requested that the court enforce the provisions of the restrictive covenants. Mr. Levine submitted a motion for summary judgment and this request is the focal point of the court’s analysis and decision.
The court denied Mr. Levine’s motion for summary judgment, holding that the “issues raised by the defendant [Levine] concerning the breadth and enforceability of the NSA should await trial and should not be resolved through summary judgment”. The judge felt that summary judgment was inappropriate for this case because the parties’ claims raised “genuine issues of disputed fact not amenable to summary disposition”. Mr. Levine presented several arguments as to why the agreements were unenforceable and that Webster Financial’s claim lacked merit but the court rejected them as basis for granting summary judgment.
Mr. Levine argued that the restrictive covenants lacked proper consideration and that the provisions of the covenants were unreasonable in scope. He asserted that Webster Financial procured the covenants solely by the grant of stock and this represented inadequate consideration to make the agreements binding upon the parties. The court however identified several sources of consideration for the covenants such that Mr. Levine gave the covenants in exchange for the sale of LLIA, employment with Webster Financial, and the issuance of shares of stock. The court also refuted Mr. Levine’s contention that the provisions were unreasonable in scope because there was no expressed geographical limitation. The court concluded that the absence of an expressed limited area did not render the restriction unreasonable because the language of the agreement itself sufficiently restricted its application of the employment prohibitions.
Mr. Levine failed to meet the burden of proof necessary to show that the case did not have disputed material facts and that he was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law, causing the court to deny his motion for summary judgment.
If you have any questions relating to your non-compete agreement or would like to discuss any element of your employment agreement, please contact Joseph C. Maya, Esq. by phone at (203) 221-3100 or via e-mail at JMaya@Mayalaw.com.